EU-wide stress testing announcement: The reaction of stock returns by Tsiouris, Nikolaos
  
 
 
EU-wide stress testing an-
nouncement: The reaction 
of stock returns 
 
Nikolaos Tsiouris 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION & LEGAL STUDIES 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Banking & Finance 
 
 
 
 
October 2015 
Thessaloniki – Greece 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Student Name:  Nikolaos Tsiouris 
SID:  1103140019 
Supervisor: Prof. Nikos Nomikos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 
another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the 
Student’s Handbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2015 
Thessaloniki - Greece 
 
  
Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking & Finance at the In-
ternational Hellenic University.  
A bank stress test is an analysis performed under extreme economic scenarios 
which is planned to investigate whether the institution has enough capital to cope with 
the impact of various economic abnormalities in the financial system. The main pur-
pose of this study is to find out the impact that the 2014 stress test results’ an-
nouncement, conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA), has on the stock 
returns of the tested banking institutions. The first concern was to clearly set the scene 
of the stress test procedure by illustrating some vital aspects regarding the roots of 
this process, the mechanics behind that, the objectives and generally all the factors 
that lead the regulatory authorities perform this type of analysis. 
In order to have measurable outcomes that could help me precisely estimate 
the impact of the announcement I employed the standard event study methodology. I 
firstly defined the event of interest along with the estimation and event window. 
Moreover, I set the selection criteria so as to have the final sample and then moved to 
the estimation of the normal and abnormal returns. After calculating the Average Ab-
normal Return (AAR) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) I assessed 
whether the estimated t-statistic values are statistically significant or not. 
This study was formed under the supervision of Professor Nikos Nomikos. His 
valuable guidelines, comments and corrections helped me finish my dissertation in the 
time allotted. 
Keywords: (Stress test; Basel Accord; stock returns; standard event study methodolo-
gy) 
 
Nikolaos Tsiouris 
October 2015 
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1. Introduction 
It was 2008 when the world economy and especially the world banking system 
faced the second most severe incident after the Great Depression in 1929. The col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers which at that time had been triggered by the overexposure 
of the institution to large positions in subprime and other lower-rated mortgage 
tranches brought in light inefficiencies that had not been fully identified and con-
trolled. The insolvency of Lehman Brothers made clear that risk mitigation is of vital 
importance for the financial system due to its central role. Such inefficiencies that in 
many cases are able to fuel a financial shock had to be identified and reviewed period-
ically for risk mitigation or even elimination purposes. For that reason the stress test-
ing procedure conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) can prove to be 
one of the most important tools for the expansion and well-being of the banking sys-
tem. 
The purpose of my study is to identify to what extent the announcement of 
stress testing results affect the stock price of the examined financial institutions. The 
main questions to be answered are: 
 What are the roots and structure of the stress testing procedure? 
 What are the mechanics of stress testing? 
 Does the stress testing announcement affect the financial markets and es-
pecially the stock returns of the tested institutions? 
For these reasons, I will follow the standard event study methodology in order 
to examine the reaction of stock returns to the fourth EU-wide stress test of 2014. 
                                                   
                                                      2 
 
1.1 The role of stress testing for the banking system 
It is lucid that banks due to their central role face risks that could threaten the 
national and global economic stability. These risks may include market risk, credit risk 
or liquidity risk. The mitigation of these types of risk involve pro-action of both the 
bank individually and the regulators. The banking system is so interconnected that an 
unprecedented shock in one institution can cause a domino effect which in turn may 
impact the global financial soundness. 
In order to ensure the safety of the system the stress testing procedure is be-
coming stricter, applying more and more scenarios that in extreme cases could harm 
the viability of the tested institutions. The whole examination procedure provides val-
uable help to all concerned parties so as to enhance the well-being of the system. It is 
the major role, the “too big to fail” idea that makes the regulatory authorities at Euro-
pean and national level to take actions for the implementation of stress testing plans 
in order to shield the banking system. 
 
1.2 Objectives of stress tests  
 
When discussing about stress testing we have to consider the objectives that 
drive banks and regulators to perform these case scenarios. Perhaps, the most impor-
tant objective of financial stress testing is to identify the impact that financial implica-
tions have on the whole financial system. The purpose of this procedure is a factor that 
distinguishes these tests to those used firstly for internal and secondly for external use. 
Internal stress testing mainly reflects the managerial ethics and culture of the organi-
zation while external testing has to be clearly understood by the target audience. 
As Drehmann (2008) suggests, there is a difference on how private and central 
banks view stress tests. Private Banks approach stress tests from a risk management 
point using mainly financial theory, mathematics and statistics. On the other hand, 
Central Banks approach stress tests from a macroeconomic perspective demanding 
macroeconomic fundamentals to be included in the formation of the procedure. 
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For internal purposes we can recognize two broad objectives: validation and 
decision making. Validation is employed as a tool in order to assess the model’s accu-
racy. In other words, it is used to estimate the might of the capital model. For example, 
“historical stress tests can offer insights whether the 99th confidence interval indicated 
by a capital model may be correct or not”(Drehmann, 2008). Validation as a tool can 
lead us in another major objective which is the decision making process. Stress testing 
in internal level has proved to be beneficial in the institution’s performance forecast-
ing. Thus, a bank can set some capital and trading goals according to its risk profile and 
periodically evaluate their performance. In the organization’s long term planning, 
stress tests should facilitate the tractability of the model so as to help senior managers 
engage in the analysis of different case scenarios. Supervisory authorities can use 
stress tests for decision making as well. By using these tools the authorities can detect 
some core vulnerabilities of the financial system. Additionally, broad stress testing by 
authorities like the European Banking Authority (EBA) in tandem with national testing 
enhance cross-checking, making it easier to identify failures in the system and hence 
boosting comparability. 
 
As far as the external purposes are concerned the key objective mainly for Cen-
tral Banks that do not act as supervisory authorities is the external communication. 
The aforementioned banks illustrate stress test results in their financial stability re-
ports proving that there is a close link between external communication and internal 
decision making. The model used in this process should be sufficient for storytelling to 
support the presentation and quantification of possible susceptibilities and complica-
tions of the system. In addition, it is noteworthy that the model should be fully trans-
parent and tractable in order to be clear and understandable for the concerning au-
dience. This audience can vary from risk managers to executive and financial officers of 
a private bank. 
The objectives of stress test are pretty clear but in order to be plausible they 
have to overcome some challenges. The biggest problem a modeler is facing is: data 
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limitation and endogeneity of risk. Data scarcity is a great implication when forming 
strict stress episodes. The availability of data influence the modeler’s decision to what 
risks the model should be exposed and ultimately what risk measures to choose. “For 
example, very few stress tests endogenise cyclical variations in loss given default (LGD) 
because of data problems”(Drehmann, 2008).The other big challenge is the endogenei-
ty of risk. Endogenous risk is the type of risk generated by the own behavioral reac-
tions of the different parties of the economy (policy makers etc.). The endogeneity of 
risk is a prominent aspect that questions the fundamentals and the status of a stress 
test model. 
1.3 The Basel Accord regulatory framework 
 
The background of the Basel Accords date back in the 1973 when the Cologne-
based Herstatt Bank was messy liquidated by the German authorities. The time lag due 
to the different time zones made the settlement with counterparty banks impossible 
causing a huge shock to the system. This event urged the G-10 countries to form the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The Basel Committee was designed 
under the patronage of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) based in Basel, 
Switzerland. Since then there have been released three Accords in 1988 (Basel I), in 
2004 (Basel II) and in 2013 (Basel III). 
1.3.1. Basel I 
Basel I was implemented in 1988 mainly focusing to mitigate credit risk. To do 
so a minimum capital requirement for credit risk was needed. Basel I, is divided into 
four major pillars (Balin, 2008): 
 Pillar 1(The constituents of capital): It defines what types of on-hand capital are 
counted as a bank’s reserves and how much of each type of reserve capital a 
bank can hold. The capital reserves are categorized into 2 tiers. The Tier 1 capi-
tal includes two types of funds: the disclosed cash reserves and other capital 
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paid for by the sale of bank equity. Tier 2  include reserves created to cover po-
tential loan losses, holdings of subordinated debt, hybrid debt/equity instru-
ment holdings, and potential gains from the sale of assets purchased through 
the sale of bank stock. 
 Pillar 2 (Risk Weighting): Risk weighting creates a solid system to risk-weight a 
bank’s assets, that is to say, its loanbook. There are five categories that include 
all the assets on the balance sheet of a bank. The first category gives 0% weight 
to the assets characterizing them as riskless. These assets are: cash held by a 
bank, sovereign debt held and funded in domestic currency, all OECD debt, and 
other claims on OECD central governments. The second risk class, weights asset 
at 20% (low risk assets). In this category are included multilateral development 
bank debt, bank debt created by banks incorporated in the OECD, non-OECD 
bank debt with a maturity of less than one year, cash items in collection, and 
loans guaranteed by OECD public sector entities. The third category gives 50% 
weight to residential mortgages calling them securities of “moderate risk”. The 
fourth, “high risk” category is weighted at 100% of an asset’s value and includes 
a bank’s claims on the private sector, non-OECD bank debt with a maturity of 
more than one year, claims on non-OECD dollar-denominated debt or Euro-
bonds, equity assets held by the bank, and all other assets. Lastly, the fifth class 
incorporates claims on domestic public sector entities, which can be valued at 
0, 10, 20, or 50% depending on the central bank’s discretion.    
 Pillar 3 (A Target Standard Ration): The third pillar consolidates the first and 
second pillars of the Basel I Accord. It sets a minimum 8% of risk weighted as-
sets that should be covered by Tier1 and Tier 2 capital reserves. Half of that 
(4%) must be covered by Tier 1 capital. 
 Pillar 4 ( Implementation): It is requested by every country’s central bank to set 
strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to make sure that the Basel 
Accords are followed and transition weight are given so the banks can adopt 
the standards of the accords within a four-year period. 
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1.3.2. Basel II 
The criticism followed the implementation of Basel I Accord made the Basel 
Committee to move on by releasing a more comprehensive framework for capital ade-
quacy, known as the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards” or informally the Basel II Accord. 
Basel II is composed of three pillars(Cardinali & Nordmark, 2011): 
 Minimum Capital Requirements 
 Supervisory Review Process 
 Market Discipline 
In the first pillar the committee gives an overview of the calculation of the min-
imum capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk. The capital ratio is 
calculated using the definition of regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. The total 
capital ratio must be no lower than 8%. Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). In the first pillar we have an evalua-
tion of the regulatory capital in terms of the three types of risk: credit risk, market risk 
and operational risk. 
Regarding credit risk, banks have the permission by the committee to follow 
two broad methodologies for calculating the capital requirements. The first is the 
Standardized Approach which measures credit risk in a standardized manner using ex-
ternal credit assessments while the second the Internal Ratings-based Approach is sub-
ject to the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor, allowing banks to use their inter-
nal rating systems for credit risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
As for the operational risk the calculation of the reserves is such to protect the 
bank from failures in the internal processes and some other unexpected external 
events.  Market risk on the other hand is decomposed by the Basel II Accord in sub-
categories like interest rate risk and volatility risk separating fixed income products 
from other products such as equity, commodity and foreign exchange products (Balin, 
2008). 
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The second pillar deals with the Supervisory Review Process. This process is de-
signed not only to ensure that banks have all the necessary capital to support any risk 
they undertake from their operations but also to encourage banks to use state-of-the-
art techniques to monitor and mitigate any threat that may arise. As it is mentioned by 
the committee (2006): ”The supervisory review process recognizes the responsibility of 
bank management in developing an internal capital assessment process and setting 
capital targets that are commensurate with the bank’s risk profile and control envi-
ronment”. 
The third pillar copes with market discipline. Market discipline can be enhanced 
by creating a bunch of requirements which will encourage all the market participants 
to assess information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assess-
ment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
 
1.3.3. Basel III 
 
The global financial crisis triggered in 2007-2008 forced the Basel Committee to 
release a new set of rules, known as the Basel III Accord. The new regulatory frame-
work was originally developed to strengthen bank capital requirements. To do so 
banks should increase their liquidity along with decreasing their leverage1. The third 
Accord was introduced in 2013 and was scheduled to hold until 2015 but the financial 
conditions urged the committee to extend the implementation period until 2019. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements2 (BIS) the Basel III Accord 
aims to:  
 Improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source. 
                                                     
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III 
2 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm 
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 Improve risk management and governance. 
 Strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. 
 
The key principles of the third Accord can be classified into three categories: 
capital requirements, leverage ratio and liquidity requirements. 
Concerning the capital requirements all banks are asked to hold 4.5% of com-
mon equity of risk weighted assets. Additionally, since 2015 all banks are obliged to 
maintain a minimum Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 4.5%.The minimum Tier 1 
capital increases from 4% in Basel II to 6%, applicable in 2015, over RWAs. This 6% is 
composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an extra 1.5% of Additional Tier 1 (AT1)3.  
As far as the Leverage Ratio is concerned, the Accord imposes a minimum ratio 
that is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the bank's average total consolidated as-
sets. It is mandatory that all banks maintain a minimum 3% Leverage Ratio under the 
norms of Basel III.  
To fortify the liquidity requirements of the banking sector the committee intro-
duced two major liquidity ratios: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio. According to the LCR, banks are required to hold enough high-quality 
liquid assets to cover their total net cash outflows over 30 days. As for the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio the banking institutions should maintain sufficient amount of stable 
funding to exceed the required amount of stable funding over a one-year period of ex-
tended stress4. 
1.4 EU-wide stress testing overview 
The idea of performing a collective stress testing exercise in EU-wide level came 
in 2009 when the ECOFIN authorized the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) along with the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
                                                     
3  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_arrangements 
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III 
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coordinate an EU-wide forward looking stress testing process on the banking sector. 
This process was built on common directives and scenarios for a group of 22 leading 
European banking institutions. The main objective of this exercise was to boost the 
quantity and quality of information that policy makers have, when estimating the flex-
ibility of the European financial system5. 
The first EU-wide stress testing exercise carried out in 2009 was based on two 
main elements (CEBS press release, 2009): 
1. An assessment of credit risks based on two sets of commonly agreed macro 
economic scenarios. A baseline scenario and an adverse one representing a se-
vere but plausible event based on the data provided by the European Commis-
sion and the European Central Bank. 
2. A sensitivity analysis on the trading book based on commonly agreed parame-
ters. 
The second exercise performed in 2010, has been conducted on a sample of 91 
European banking institutions, representing 65% of the total assets of the EU banking 
sector. That particular stress testing process focused mainly on risks such as credit and 
market risk, including the exposure of the institutions to European sovereign debt. 
Two sets of macro-economic scenarios (benchmark, adverse) have been used to pro-
ceed with the exercise, including a sovereign shock scenario covering the period 2010-
2011. 
In 2011 the European Banking Authority decided to launch a new round of 
stress test in close cooperation with the national supervisory authorities, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Com-
mission. The third stress test exercise was built upon the exercise of the former year 
testing the resilience of 91 European banks to adverse but plausible scenarios. 
                                                     
5 cebs’s press release on the results of the EU-wide stress testing exercise, 1 October 
2009 
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According to the European banking Authority (EBA)6 the 2011 EU-wide stress 
test results illustrate that: 
 At the end of 2010, twenty banks would fall below the 5% Core Tier 1 Ratio 
(CT1R) threshold over the two-year horizon of the exercise. The overall shortfall 
would total EUR 26.8 billion. 
 Between January and April 2011, a further net amount of some EUR 50 bn. of 
capital was raised. 
 Taking into account these capital raising actions implemented by the end of 
April 2011 eight banks fall below the capital threshold of 5% CT1R over the two 
year time horizon with an overall CT1 shortfall of EUR2.5 bn. and sixteen banks 
display a CT1R of between 5% and 6%. 
The last stress testing exercise till nowadays came in 2014.The major objec-
tive of the 2014 stress tests was to help regulators assess the resilience of the Eu-
ropean banking system to severe market developments. The overall process was 
planned to give concerned parties (regulators, market participants etc.) all the in-
formation needed to evaluate the flexibility of the EU banking institutions under 
extreme events. 124 EU banks participated and were asked to point up a group of 
risks including: credit risk, market risk and sovereign risk. Moreover, trade and 
banking book assets were set under scrutiny along with off-balance sheet expo-
sures. The official EBA press release regarding the results of the 2014 stress test 
mentions:  
“…EU banks' common equity ratio (CET1) drops by 260 basis points, 
from 11.1% at the start of the exercise, after the asset quality re-
views' (AQRs) adjustment, to 8.5% after the stress. By disclosing 
these results, the EBA is providing unparalleled transparency into EU 
banks' balance sheets, with up to 12,000 data points per bank, an es-
sential step towards enhancing market discipline in the EU”. 
                                                     
6 Results of the 2011 EU-wide stress test, 15 July 2011 
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2. Literature Review 
The effect that different types of announcements have on stock prices has 
been broadly studied in the scientific community. Particularly, a lot of academic papers 
cover the effect of dividend, stock split, M&A announcement on the stock returns of 
the examined companies. Some of these essays applied the standard event study me-
thodology which is a statistical technique mainly used to examine how stock returns 
react to various corporate events. 
Gunasekarage and Power (2002) examined the post-announcement perfor-
mance of U.K. companies which disclose dividend and earnings news to the capital 
market on the same day. They analyzed the market-adjusted excess returns for three 
periods around the announcement and then studied the financial performance in the 
year of the announcement and in the following five year period. They collected a sam-
ple of 1,787 announcements during a five year period from 1989-1993. Their main 
findings suggest that the performance of these companies deteriorated consistently 
throughout the post-announcement period. They also point out that the mean revert-
ing pattern in the accounting variables propose that a reduction in dividend is evidence 
of a company adapting its corporate finance policies to turn their performance around. 
Burton, Lonie and David (1999) tried to shed light on the way in which equity 
investors react to news of large cash outflows by companies in which they have a large 
stake. In other words, they investigated the UK stock market reactions to the an-
nouncement of different types of capital expenditure. They examined approximately 
500 announcements made by UK firms during a three year period from 1989-1991. 
They came to a conclusion by mentioning that investors’ response to this news de-
pends on (i) whether the project is undertaken by an individual firm or as part of a 
joint venture and (ii) whether the investment generates cash immediately or recoups 
its investment only after a period of several years. 
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Beer (1993) explored the market reaction to dividend changes on the Brussels 
Stock Exchange by relating it to information releases by the firms. The purpose was to 
determine whether unexpected dividend changes convey pertinent information for 
example, information beyond that provided by earnings numbers. She investigated 
two samples of Belgian companies. The first sample includes firms paying dividends on 
a regular basis and the second sample contains firms resuming payment of dividends 
after a lapse of at least three consecutive years. The sample size was 135 companies 
comprising 68% of the total number of domestic companies. Beer ended up by pre-
senting that the market reaction is weak and not significant. She also found differences 
between Belgian investors’ behavior and US investors’ behavior. 
Easton and Harris (1991) in their paper “Earnings as an Explanatory Variable for 
Returns” studied the possibility that the level of earnings divided by price at the begin-
ning of the stock return period is relevant for evaluating earnings/returns associations. 
They selected 20,188 observations for a period of 17 years from 1969-1986. In their 
concluding remarks they mention that there is a relationship between the level of cur-
rent accounting earnings divided by beginning-of-period price and stock returns. It is 
also suggested that earnings variables do play a role in security valuation. 
Bhana (2008) conducted a study on capital investment announcements by ap-
plying the standard event study methodology to measure whether the investment de-
cisions of South African companies are consistent with the goal of maximizing share-
holder wealth. He employed 378 capital expenditure announcements by companies 
listed on the JSE during the period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2004. All in all, he 
found significant positive excess returns surrounding capital spending announcements. 
He also observed that information related to the capital expenditure decisions are im-
pounded in the share prices three days prior to the public announcement and that the 
market responds significantly and positively to capital announcements by focused 
firms, whereas there is a much weaker response to announcements by diversified 
companies. 
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Neuhierl, Scherbina and Davis (2013) assess the relative importance of corpo-
rate news to the market. They also investigate the patterns of changes in stock volatili-
ty, bid-ask spreads, and trading volume following different types of news. They ga-
thered corporate press releases that have been issued between April 2006 and August 
2009. Their results show that volatility tends to increase following most types of an-
nouncements, and attribute these volatility increases to higher levels of news-induced 
valuation uncertainty. Lastly, they illustrate that press releases remove the informa-
tional advantage of firm insiders, resulting in lower post-announcement bid-ask 
spreads. 
Fama et al. (1969) stressed the process by which common stock prices adjust to 
the information that is implicit in a stock split. They collected 940 splits occurred in the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from January 1927, through December 1959.By using 
the event study methodology they proved that the market utilizes the announcement 
of a split to re-evaluate the stream of expected income from the shares. Their main 
finding is that stock prices adjust very rapidly to new information hence we can see the 
market as efficient. 
As far as the standard event study methodology is concerned Armitage (1995) 
outlines widely used methods of estimating abnormal returns and testing their signi-
ficance, highlights respects in which they differ conceptually and reviews research 
comparing results they produce in various empirical contexts. He suggests that event 
study methods are worth reviewing because of their many variations and their very 
wide application in empirical research. Additionally, Bowman (1983) provided a struc-
ture for the design of event studies, to differentiate them by type and to discuss some 
issues which are crucial to their understanding. Lastly, Binder (1998) points out that 
the event study methodology is, with some corrections for statistical problems that 
arise in certain cases, a powerful tool to detect the impact of speciﬁc events on securi-
ty prices. He mentions that the market model works well as a measure of the bench-
mark rate of return and that researchers found unbiased and powerful tests of hypo-
theses about the average effect of the event on the sample ﬁrms. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
In this part we have to employ the standard event study methodology in order 
to pinpoint the impact that the 2014 EU-wide Stress testing results’ announcement 
had on the returns of the participating financial institutions. According to Campbell et 
al. (1997) the standard event study methodology is categorized into five main steps. 
These steps include: event definition, selection criteria, normal and abnormal returns, 
estimation procedure and testing procedure. 
3.1 Event Definition 
In order to start working with a standard event study methodology we should 
first define the event of our interest. In our case the event that we need to examine is 
the announcement of the results of the 2014 EU-wide stress testing procedure that 
took place on the 27th October 2014. We use a ten-day window, where the an-
nouncement day is the event day [-10, 0, +10]. It is clear cut that we are interested in 
the stock price reaction after the announcement day. In Figure 1 we can see the time-
line for an event window but before we move on it is essential to define and distinct 
between the estimation and the event period. The estimation period (examined first) 
is the period which proceeds the announcement day. On the other hand, the event 
period is defined as the duration for computing the consequences of the results’ an-
nouncement on the shareholders share prices. An important issue regarding the esti-
mation and event period is that many times these periods are not defined well and co-
incide with each other, driving into wrong and misleading results. For this project as it 
can be seen in the figure below the estimation period will be from (T1-T0), accounting 
for 300 days and the event window from (T 1+1 to T2) with length of 21 days.  
Figure 1. Timeline for an event window  
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3.2 Selection Criteria 
The banking institutions that form the sample should meet some criteria so as 
to be selected. The criteria in order for a bank to be included in the sample are:  
 Banks should have daily traded stock 300 days prior to the event window (es-
timation period) and 10 days subsequent to the announcement date. 
 Banks should not be private or unlisted. 
The aforementioned criteria in our case are only met by 55 European banks 
from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and 
UK. 
3.3 Normal and Abnormal Returns 
Having decided the estimation and the event window, the next step is to 
choose the most appropriate model initially for the estimation of the expected returns  
and then for the abnormal ones. But first we should define normal returns. The normal 
return of a stock price is defined as the return that would be expected if the event did 
not take place. We estimate normal returns as: 
                                                Ri,t = ln(Pi,t) - ln(Pi,t-1)                   (1) 
 
Where:                         Ri,t     = the actual return of share i on day t; 
                                      Pi,t       = the price of share i on day t; 
                                      Pi,t-1   = the price of share i on day t-1. 
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It is generally accepted that there are numerous models that can be used to es-
timate the expected returns. Some of them are statistical and some economic. The 
most common statistical models used, are the market model, the risk adjusted model 
and the constant mean return model while the most known economic model is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It is widely accepted that the use of economic 
models provide better results than these of the statistical, because they do not fail to 
take into account statistical assumptions (MacKinlay, 1997). For this project the market 
model is employed for the simple reason that it embodies not only the two other 
models, but it can lead to better and more reliable results, since it manages to decline 
the increased variance of the abnormal returns, where the other models fail to do it. 
The market model can be defined as the model at which the stock returns is a linear 
function of the market return (Rm) plus a constant alpha (a). The beta (β) represents 
the firm’s systematic risk and is included to the equation because it directly influences 
the sensitivity of the firm’s return with response to the market return. The expected 
return can be calculated as: 
                                                  E(Rit) = αi+ βi  E(Rmt)                   (2) 
 
Where                        Rit      = the rate of return on stock price of firm i at time t;  
                                    Rmt       = the rate of return of the market index;  
                                    αi           = the intercept term; and, 
                                    βi           = a regression constant. 
The next step in our calculations is to estimate the abnormal returns. The ab-
normal return is the difference between the actual and the expected return and can be 
written algebraically as: 
                                                  ARi,t   = Ri,t  - E(Ri,t)                       (3)     
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Where                       ARi,t       = the abnormal return on share i on day t; and, 
                                  E(Ri,t)   =the expected return on share i on day t. 
The average abnormal return (AAR) for the examined institutions in each coun-
try in period t is calculated as follows: 
                                                 AARt=
1
𝑛  
  AAni=1 R it                  (4)   
Where                         AARt      = the average abnormal return for time t; 
                                    AARit      = the abnormal return for bank I at time t; and, 
                                      n           = the sample size. 
In order to find the magnitude of the abnormal returns over the event window 
we have to calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) which can be 
estimated as: 
                                                  CAARt = CAARt-1 + AARt           (5) 
 
Where                  CAARt        = the cumulative average abnormal return at time t; 
                               CAARt-1     = the cumulative average abnormal return at time t-1;    
                            AARt            = the average abnormal return at time t. 
 
3.4 Estimation Procedure 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) had proved that choosing a shorter duration for 
an event window can always lead to better and more robust results. A shorter period 
can better capture the consequences that the announcement will have on the share 
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price, due to the new information being released in the market. Contrary, a longer 
event window can significantly decline the robustness of the test statistic, leading 
therefore to wrong results regarding the importance of the event as stated by  Brown 
and Warner (1985). Finally according to Siegel and McWilliams (1997) the use of a long 
event window violates the market efficiency assumptions and that comes from the fact 
that it is difficult for the new information to be included in the stock price effectively in 
the long run. 
 
3.5 Testing Procedure 
The last step in the methodology in order to conduct a standard event study is 
to estimate the parametric t-statistics. This estimation is a good as well as reliable way 
to find out whether the excess returns are significantly different from zero at a speci-
fied significance level. In other words the null Hypothesis that we test is: 
AAR Significance:       Ho: E(AARt) = 0                                      (6)    
Against the two-sided alternative hypothesis 
                                   H1: E(AARt) ≠ 0 
and 
CAAR Significance:     Ho: E(CAAR t1,t2) = 0                            (7) 
Against the two-sided alternative hypothesis 
                                   H1: E(CAAR t1,t2) ≠ 0 
If (H0=0) is true then it means that the announcement of the stress test results 
do not have either positive or negative impact on share price. On the other hand, if H0 
is not true then the announcements of the results affect in a positive or negative way 
the share prices.  
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4. Empirical Results 
After conducting the standard event study methodology, the estimated results 
(Appendix, tables 1-10) give valuable information regarding the impact that the an-
nouncement of the 2014 stress tests have on the returns of the examined banking in-
stitutions. The findings illustrate that the results’ announcement does not affect the 
participating banks in the same way but the magnitude of the impact depends on dif-
ferent aspects. In order to proceed with the interpretation of the main findings for the 
banks of each EU country that we tested, we should first define two major factors that 
we employed in the methodology section and play the most vital role in the explana-
tion of the results. These two factors are the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR). By using the Average Abnormal Return 
(AAR) we aggregate all the abnormal returns for all stocks so as to estimate the aver-
age abnormal return at time t. This can help us eradicate peculiarities in our estimation 
due to specific stocks. On the other hand the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) which is the sum of the average abnormal returns can prove to be a very useful 
statistical tool because it can help us understand the cumulative effect of the abnor-
mal returns. The interpretation of our main findings will be based on the estimated 
AAR’s and CAAR’s of each country which are statistically significant at a 95% confi-
dence level according to t-test. 
In Austria we can observe that the AAR is statistically significant at the event 
day (27/10/2014) as well as three days after that. All the other days in the event win-
dow are proved to be insignificant. The CAAR is significant at the event day and all the 
following days of the event window but it is also significant at the first, fourth, fifth and 
seventh day before the event. As far as Belgium is concerned we can see that the AAR 
is only significant the tenth day after the announcement date while the CAAR is signifi-
cant five times after the 27th of October and two times before that. It is significant at 
14/10, 21/10, 28/10, 30/10, 3/11, 7/11 and 10/11. In Cyprus the Average Abnormal 
Return (AAR) is significant only four days after the event day while the Cumulative Av-
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erage Abnormal Return (CAAR) is significant ten consecutive days after the announce-
ment day. In Germany the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) is statistically insignificant 
throughout the event window. Regarding the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) it is only significant the sixth day after the 27th of October when the stress test-
ing results were announced. Moving on to Denmark we can note that there is not a 
single day in the event window that the AAR is statistically significant, but this is not 
the case for the CAAR where the event day, the following ten days and four successive 
days before that are significant. In Spain the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) follows 
the same pattern as Denmark where all days in the event window are statistically in-
significant. As for the CAAR only the nineteenth day of the event window is significant. 
In terms of the AAR, in France the 27th of October is statistically insignificant. Before 
that day only the second and ninth day of the pre announcement event window are 
significant. With reference to the post announcement event window we can detect 
that the coming two days after the announcement are also statistically significant in-
cluding the 7th of November which is the ninth day of our event window. The Cumula-
tive Average Abnormal return (CAAR) in France is not significant in the event day but 
five consecutive days before that including the ninth day of the pre announcement 
event window.  After the event only the fifth and eighth day of the post announce-
ment window are insignificant. The results in Greece are pretty weird. Although every-
body would expect that the announcement of the stress testing results would have a 
severe impact on the stock returns, this is not the case. While the event day is insignifi-
cant both in terms of the AAR and the CAAR we can see that as regards the AAR only 
the ninth day of the pre announcement window is significant followed by the first, 
second and eighth day ex post. All days before the event have totally insignificant 
CAAR and there are only four days after the event in which the CAAR is proved to be 
significant. The findings for Hungary are obvious. The AAR is insignificant all over the 
event window. As for the CAAR the situation is the same with the only exception to be 
the 15th of October that is five days before the results’ release. In Ireland the Average 
Abnormal Returns (AAR) indicates that the market reacts to the news only the second, 
third, sixth, seventh and ninth day after the event took place. On the other hand the 
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CAAR presents some market reaction the seventh day before the event as well as the 
third, sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth day after that. In Italy both the Average Abnormal 
Returns (AAR) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) are insignificant 
through the whole event period window. In Malta the only day that illustrates some 
market reaction is the second day after the event regarding the CAAR while the AAR’s 
are totally insignificant. In Norway we can spot that throughout the event window the 
AAR is statistically significant only during the event day as well as the second, sixth and 
seventh day of the pre announcement period. The CAAR is significant during the whole 
period excluding only the first, second and fourth day of the window. According to the 
estimated t-statistic values for both the AAR and the CAAR in Poland we can notice 
that the market reacted only the sixth day of the post announcement CAAR event win-
dow. In Portugal the impact of the stress test results is minor. Considering the AAR, the 
t-stat values are significant only in three particular days. Those are the 20th October 
and the 5th and 6th of November. The calculated CAAR values illustrate that the first 
and third day before the event the returns are proved to be significant followed by the 
second, eighth and tenth day of the post announcement era. In Sweden, regarding the 
AAR the market shows some significance during the event day. There are also four 
days in the whole event period that present the same significance. In chronological or-
der these days are the 17th, 21st, 29th October and the 4th of November. In the CAAR’s 
case the market reacted differently. As we can notice there is a strong impact in the t-
statistic values one day before the event and for all the following days of the window. 
Finally, in the UK the AAR values do not bear any noticeable impact from the an-
nouncement of the results. The only market reaction in our UK sample can be detected 
the last 6 days of the CAAR event window. 
5. Conclusion 
With this study we tried to sheds light on a field that is rather new in the eco-
nomic and financial community. Although banking issues tend to concern economists 
for many decades the so called banking stress tests appeared in such a scale after the 
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financial distress in the USA that came after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Lehman 
Brothers caused a domino effect that influenced most of the economies worldwide. 
The strongest economies easily overcame this abnormality but the weakest for exam-
ple; Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) still face the consequences, trying 
to reform their banking and public sectors. In order to shield the European banking 
structure the European Union implemented a periodic stress testing procedure which 
examines the strength and capabilities of some European banking institutions under 
extreme case scenarios. The scene for this process was set by the Basel Accord Regula-
tory Framework which is nothing more than a set of directives whose main purpose is 
to act supplementary to the European and national legislature framework. The afore-
mentioned regulatory framework has been released by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (BCBS), formed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) based in 
Basel, Switzerland and came into three parts: Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. Back to the 
study itself, this essay examines stress testing from an economic perspective, providing 
a theoretical background supported by an empirical research. More concretely, it 
analyses the financial impact that the announcement of the 2014 stress testing results 
have on the stock returns of the target shareholders. In a theoretical level, this study 
answers some vital questions regarding the roots and structure of the procedure as 
well as the mechanics of stress testing. Specifically, it enlightens the role of stress test-
ing for the banking system, the objectives of stress testing and finally makes a broad 
analysis of the Basel Accord Regulatory Framework. In the second section of this study 
we come across the Literature Review. There is a large pool of academic papers writ-
ten by known economists concerning various issues related to the structure and role of 
the banking institutions, the threats that banks may face and possible solutions. As far 
as the empirical part of the study is concerned; an event study was conducted with the 
use of the market model as a statistical tool. The employment of the market model 
was necessary for the estimation of normal returns during the estimation period of 
300 days and then of the abnormal returns during the event period of 21 days. Specifi-
cally the event study tested the change in target shareholders’ return before, on and 
after the announcement day for 55 European Banks that met the selection criteria. 
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Trying to have a clear picture of the key empirical findings we estimated and tested the 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). 
By using the AAR we average the abnormal return so as to eliminate idiosyncratic ele-
ments of specific stocks while employing the CAAR which is the sum of the AAR’s helps 
us discern the collective effect of the abnormal returns. A two tail test for both the 
AAR and CAAR gave the t-statistic for these two factors. The t-statistic gives a clear in-
dication of the impact that the announcement of the stress test results have on the 
stock returns of the examined banking institutions. The calculated findings suggest that 
there is not an ordinary pattern among the tested banks. The force of the announce-
ment varies among countries. As we can observe some of the countries face a more 
profound impact while others a smoother one. This is because of many reasons that 
have to do with the economic, political and social environment of every country which 
cannot be included in this study but give feedback for future examination.  
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Appendix 
 
   Table 1 
 Austria   Belgium 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 0,0142 0,8201 No 0,0142 0,8201 No 
 
-0,0261 -0,8803 No -0,0261 -0,6225 No 
-9 -0,0140 -0,8099 No 0,0002 0,0102 No 
 
-0,0038 -0,5519 No -0,0299 -3,0475 Yes 
-8 0,0145 0,8384 No 0,0147 0,8486 No 
 
0,0047 0,4821 No -0,0252 -1,8500 No 
-7 0,0198 1,1476 No 0,0345 1,9963 Yes 
 
-0,0360 -0,6606 No -0,0612 -0,7948 No 
-6 -0,0056 -0,3266 No 0,0289 1,6697 No 
 
0,0271 0,7647 No -0,0341 -0,6819 No 
-5 0,0182 1,0502 No 0,0470 2,7199 Yes 
 
-0,0205 -0,5694 No -0,0547 -1,0727 No 
-4 -0,0115 -0,6667 No 0,0355 2,0532 Yes 
 
-0,0159 -1,4085 No -0,0706 -4,4097 Yes 
-3 -0,0143 -0,8270 No 0,0212 1,2261 No 
 
0,0099 0,4457 No -0,0607 -1,9374 No 
-2 0,0090 0,5189 No 0,0302 1,7451 No 
 
0,0076 0,3555 No -0,0532 -1,7671 No 
-1 0,0247 1,4315 No 0,0549 3,1766 Yes 
 
-0,0185 -0,4360 No -0,0716 -1,1966 No 
0 0,0583 3,3711 Yes 0,1132 6,5477 Yes 
 
0,0163 0,5465 No -0,0553 -1,3100 No 
1 -0,0011 -0,0646 No 0,1121 6,4831 Yes 
 
-0,0075 -0,5798 No -0,0628 -3,4531 Yes 
2 -0,0012 -0,0705 No 0,1109 6,4127 Yes 
 
-0,0036 -0,0889 No -0,0663 -1,1675 No 
3 0,0462 2,6724 Yes 0,1571 9,0851 Yes 
 
0,0192 1,4011 No -0,0471 -2,4359 Yes 
4 -0,0074 -0,4280 No 0,1497 8,6571 Yes 
 
-0,0242 -0,5213 No -0,0714 -1,0858 No 
5 0,0116 0,6694 No 0,1612 9,3264 Yes 
 
-0,0019 -0,3899 No -0,0732 -10,8128 Yes 
6 0,0110 0,6378 No 0,1723 9,9643 Yes 
 
0,0148 0,4575 No -0,0585 -1,2785 No 
7 -0,0289 -1,6744 No 0,1433 8,2899 Yes 
 
-0,0185 -0,3788 No -0,0770 -1,1131 No 
8 0,0125 0,7216 No 0,1558 9,0115 Yes 
 
0,0129 0,4964 No -0,0641 -1,7448 No 
9 0,0111 0,6403 No 0,1669 9,6518 Yes 
 
-0,0167 -0,5909 No -0,0808 -2,0214 Yes 
10 0,0110 0,6352 No 0,1778 10,2870 Yes 
 
-0,0081 -2,0257 Yes -0,0889 -15,7200 Yes 
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Table 2 
 
Cyprus   Germany 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 -0,0273 -0,6252 No -0,0273 -0,6252 No 
 
-0,0107 -0,5283 No -0,0107 -0,2362 No 
-9 -0,0013 -0,0289 No -0,0286 -0,6542 No 
 
0,0109 0,7162 No 0,0003 0,0079 No 
-8 -0,0058 -0,1336 No -0,0344 -0,7877 No 
 
-0,0035 -0,1626 No -0,0033 -0,0672 No 
-7 -0,0109 -0,2491 No -0,0453 -1,0369 No 
 
-0,0095 -1,1024 No -0,0128 -0,6623 No 
-6 0,0304 0,6959 No -0,0149 -0,3410 No 
 
-0,0049 -0,1595 No -0,0177 -0,2581 No 
-5 -0,0393 -0,9002 No -0,0542 -1,2413 No 
 
0,0001 0,0043 No -0,0177 -0,5048 No 
-4 0,0189 0,4316 No -0,0354 -0,8097 No 
 
0,0142 0,7405 No -0,0035 -0,0819 No 
-3 -0,0286 -0,6550 No -0,0640 -1,4647 No 
 
0,0162 0,5354 No 0,0127 0,1877 No 
-2 0,0096 0,2196 No -0,0544 -1,2451 No 
 
0,0122 0,6021 No 0,0249 0,5499 No 
-1 -0,0159 -0,3633 No -0,0703 -1,6085 No 
 
-0,0010 -0,1690 No 0,0239 1,8173 No 
0 -0,0107 -0,2447 No -0,0810 -1,8532 No 
 
0,0008 0,0295 No 0,0247 0,3971 No 
1 -0,0122 -0,2799 No -0,0932 -2,1331 Yes 
 
0,0122 0,7209 No 0,0370 0,9753 No 
2 -0,0010 -0,0238 No -0,0942 -2,1569 Yes 
 
-0,0038 -0,1416 No 0,0331 0,5502 No 
3 -0,0200 -0,4568 No -0,1142 -2,6137 Yes 
 
0,0064 0,3799 No 0,0395 1,0527 No 
4 -0,1916 -4,3863 Yes -0,3058 -7,0000 Yes 
 
-0,0030 -0,3296 No 0,0366 1,8259 No 
5 -0,0313 -0,7169 No -0,3371 -7,7170 Yes 
 
0,0030 0,1634 No 0,0396 0,9652 No 
6 -0,0048 -0,1097 No -0,3419 -7,8267 Yes 
 
0,0061 0,6603 No 0,0457 2,1984 Yes 
7 -0,0176 -0,4035 No -0,3596 -8,2302 Yes 
 
-0,0043 -0,3554 No 0,0414 1,5326 No 
8 -0,0338 -0,7733 No -0,3934 -9,0035 Yes 
 
0,0014 0,1169 No 0,0428 1,6428 No 
9 -0,0207 -0,4739 No -0,4141 -9,4774 Yes 
 
0,0011 0,0956 No 0,0439 1,6726 No 
10 -0,0016 -0,0368 No -0,4157 -9,5142 Yes 
 
0,0044 0,1591 No 0,0483 0,7832 No 
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Table 3 
 
Denmark   Spain 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 -0,1825 -0,6209 No -0,1825 -0,3585 No 
 
0,0094 0,7954 No 0,0094 0,3247 No 
-9 -0,1664 -0,5970 No -0,3489 -0,7228 No 
 
0,0040 0,2452 No 0,0023 0,0592 No 
-8 -0,1663 -0,6113 No -0,5151 -1,0935 No 
 
-0,0070 -0,2769 No -0,0014 -0,0226 No 
-7 -0,1782 -0,6327 No -0,6933 -1,4215 No 
 
-0,0037 -0,6972 No 0,0000 0,0011 No 
-6 -0,1467 -0,4929 No -0,8400 -1,6296 No 
 
0,0014 0,0792 No 0,0063 0,1446 No 
-5 -0,1711 -0,5723 No -1,0111 -1,9527 No 
 
0,0063 0,4468 No 0,0128 0,3704 No 
-4 -0,1535 -0,4995 No -1,1645 -2,1884 Yes 
 
0,0065 0,3897 No 0,0181 0,4429 No 
-3 -0,1540 -0,5171 No -1,3185 -2,5560 Yes 
 
0,0053 0,4361 No 0,0139 0,4687 No 
-2 -0,1635 -0,5555 No -1,4821 -2,9066 Yes 
 
-0,0043 -0,6251 No 0,0141 0,8460 No 
-1 -0,1785 -0,6051 No -1,6606 -3,2496 Yes 
 
0,0003 0,0326 No 0,0150 0,7626 No 
0 -0,1466 -0,5026 No -1,8072 -3,5761 Yes 
 
0,0009 0,0437 No 0,0125 0,2614 No 
1 -0,1651 -0,5413 No -1,9724 -3,7327 Yes 
 
-0,0024 -0,6417 No 0,0062 0,6679 No 
2 -0,1430 -0,5005 No -2,1154 -4,2750 Yes 
 
-0,0063 -0,4877 No 0,0069 0,2166 No 
3 -0,1545 -0,5443 No -2,2699 -4,6161 Yes 
 
0,0007 0,0413 No -0,0149 -0,3705 No 
4 -0,1744 -0,5775 No -2,4443 -4,6736 Yes 
 
-0,0218 -0,5929 No -0,0251 -0,2795 No 
5 -0,1716 -0,6055 No -2,6159 -5,3282 Yes 
 
-0,0103 -1,0665 No -0,0364 -1,5460 No 
6 -0,1635 -0,5763 No -2,7794 -5,6573 Yes 
 
-0,0113 -0,5524 No -0,0436 -0,8706 No 
7 -0,1682 -0,5659 No -2,9475 -5,7263 Yes 
 
-0,0071 -0,5328 No -0,0482 -1,4697 No 
8 -0,1699 -0,5887 No -3,1174 -6,2360 Yes 
 
-0,0046 -0,5490 No -0,0419 -2,0415 Yes 
9 -0,1666 -0,5841 No -3,2840 -6,6484 Yes 
 
0,0062 0,6193 No 0,0108 0,4391 No 
10 -0,1761 -0,6086 No -3,4601 -6,9044 Yes 
 
0,0527 0,6237 No 0,0108 0,0521 No 
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Table 4 
 
France   Greece 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 -0,0002 -0,0450 No -0,0002 -0,0318 No 
 
0,0137 1,5368 No 0,0137 0,7684 No 
-9 0,0047 3,1896 Yes 0,0045 2,1767 Yes 
 
-0,0710 -3,1615 Yes -0,0572 -1,2749 No 
-8 -0,0037 -0,8852 No 0,0008 0,1393 No 
 
-0,0395 -1,4698 No -0,0968 -1,7986 No 
-7 -0,0018 -0,4989 No -0,0009 -0,1889 No 
 
-0,0014 -0,0507 No -0,0982 -1,8024 No 
-6 0,0049 0,8266 No 0,0040 0,4716 No 
 
0,0396 1,0883 No -0,0586 -0,8057 No 
-5 0,0021 1,6518 No 0,0060 3,3934 Yes 
 
0,0365 1,2620 No -0,0221 -0,3809 No 
-4 0,0013 0,6531 No 0,0074 2,5418 Yes 
 
0,0509 1,9003 No 0,0288 0,5381 No 
-3 -0,0013 -1,7465 No 0,0060 5,5666 Yes 
 
-0,0091 -0,2294 No 0,0197 0,2496 No 
-2 0,0088 2,7160 Yes 0,0149 3,2326 Yes 
 
-0,0039 -0,2689 No 0,0159 0,5495 No 
-1 -0,0001 -0,0826 No 0,0148 7,8232 Yes 
 
0,0272 1,4002 No 0,0431 1,1076 No 
0 0,0016 0,2296 No 0,0163 1,7034 No 
 
-0,0215 -0,6031 No 0,0216 0,3037 No 
1 0,0010 2,2036 Yes 0,0173 27,4131 Yes 
 
-0,0473 -2,3253 Yes -0,0257 -0,6311 No 
2 0,0032 3,7659 Yes 0,0205 17,2126 Yes 
 
-0,0487 -3,5547 Yes -0,0744 -2,7144 Yes 
3 0,0018 1,1187 No 0,0222 9,8472 Yes 
 
0,0005 0,0236 No -0,0739 -1,8849 No 
4 0,0094 1,7340 No 0,0316 4,1427 Yes 
 
0,0173 0,7176 No -0,0566 -1,1700 No 
5 0,0030 0,2140 No 0,0346 1,7204 No 
 
0,0081 0,4995 No -0,0485 -1,5031 No 
6 0,0047 1,7652 No 0,0393 10,5270 Yes 
 
0,0057 1,1536 No -0,0428 -4,3097 Yes 
7 -0,0020 -0,1990 No 0,0373 2,6383 Yes 
 
0,0018 0,1636 No -0,0410 -1,9159 No 
8 -0,0043 -0,2787 No 0,0331 1,5269 No 
 
-0,0716 -2,4840 Yes -0,1127 -1,9533 No 
9 -0,0029 -25,5484 Yes 0,0302 190,4815 Yes 
 
-0,0004 -0,0184 No -0,1131 -2,4707 Yes 
10 -0,0086 -1,5378 No 0,0216 2,7367 Yes 
 
-0,0115 -0,9340 No -0,1246 -5,0786 Yes 
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Table 5 
 
Hungary   Ireland 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 -0,0047 -0,2912 No -0,0047 -0,2912 No 
 
-0,0243 -0,9441 No -0,0243 -0,6675 No 
-9 -0,0036 -0,2233 No -0,0023 -0,1436 No 
 
-0,0070 -0,0661 No -0,0313 -0,2092 No 
-8 0,0024 0,1476 No -0,0028 -0,1747 No 
 
0,0157 0,2190 No -0,0156 -0,1536 No 
-7 -0,0005 -0,0311 No -0,0262 -1,6171 No 
 
-0,0304 -1,9434 No -0,0460 -2,0774 Yes 
-6 -0,0233 -1,4424 No -0,0361 -2,2283 Yes 
 
0,0133 0,6024 No -0,0326 -1,0419 No 
-5 -0,0099 -0,6112 No -0,0149 -0,9220 No 
 
0,0097 0,1830 No -0,0229 -0,3058 No 
-4 0,0211 1,3063 No -0,0152 -0,9372 No 
 
-0,0111 -0,6793 No -0,0340 -1,4765 No 
-3 -0,0002 -0,0152 No 0,0015 0,0950 No 
 
0,0629 1,0711 No 0,0289 0,3483 No 
-2 0,0167 1,0322 No 0,0058 0,3554 No 
 
0,0141 0,2006 No 0,0430 0,4338 No 
-1 0,0042 0,2604 No 0,0036 0,2232 No 
 
-0,0926 -1,4523 No -0,0496 -0,5502 No 
0 -0,0021 -0,1322 No 0,0119 0,7373 No 
 
-0,0062 -0,2985 No -0,0558 -1,9129 No 
1 0,0083 0,5140 No -0,0027 -0,1650 No 
 
0,0216 0,1823 No -0,0342 -0,2036 No 
2 -0,0146 -0,9022 No -0,0038 -0,2345 No 
 
0,0297 2,4827 Yes -0,0044 -0,2611 No 
3 -0,0011 -0,0695 No 0,0100 0,6185 No 
 
0,0380 4,1388 Yes 0,0336 2,5859 Yes 
4 0,0138 0,8529 No 0,0056 0,3445 No 
 
-0,0498 -1,0245 No -0,0162 -0,2360 No 
5 -0,0044 -0,2740 No -0,0055 -0,3397 No 
 
0,0237 0,3524 No 0,0075 0,0785 No 
6 -0,0111 -0,6841 No 0,0038 0,2339 No 
 
-0,0567 -3,3943 Yes -0,0492 -2,0844 Yes 
7 0,0093 0,5736 No -0,0001 -0,0035 No 
 
-0,0125 -5,9463 Yes -0,0618 -20,7186 Yes 
8 -0,0038 -0,2374 No -0,0093 -0,5770 No 
 
0,0179 0,4098 No -0,0439 -0,7093 No 
9 -0,0093 -0,5735 No -0,0074 -0,4548 No 
 
-0,0368 -20,1926 Yes -0,0807 -31,2924 Yes 
10 0,0020 0,1221 No -0,0074 -0,4548 No 
 
-0,0150 -0,5182 No -0,0957 -2,3376 Yes 
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Table 6 
 
Italy   Malta 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 -0,0025 -0,2408 No -0,0025 -0,0761 No 
 
-0,0192 -1,9043 No -0,0192 -1,9043 No 
-9 0,0001 0,0050 No -0,0024 -0,0423 No 
 
0,0043 0,4260 No -0,0046 -0,4603 No 
-8 -0,0063 -0,5827 No -0,0086 -0,2541 No 
 
0,0145 1,4441 No 0,0043 0,4236 No 
-7 -0,0023 -0,0874 No -0,0110 -0,1294 No 
 
0,0089 0,8839 No 0,0020 0,1990 No 
-6 0,0055 0,4663 No -0,0055 -0,1468 No 
 
-0,0023 -0,2246 No -0,0020 -0,2017 No 
-5 0,0029 0,2465 No -0,0025 -0,0673 No 
 
-0,0040 -0,4008 No 0,0011 0,1101 No 
-4 0,0080 0,7734 No 0,0055 0,1673 No 
 
0,0031 0,3118 No -0,0006 -0,0634 No 
-3 -0,0030 -0,1648 No 0,0025 0,0431 No 
 
-0,0017 -0,1735 No -0,0015 -0,1457 No 
-2 -0,0075 -0,6774 No -0,0050 -0,1431 No 
 
-0,0008 -0,0823 No -0,0022 -0,2160 No 
-1 0,0189 0,6487 No 0,0139 0,1507 No 
 
-0,0007 -0,0703 No -0,0015 -0,1466 No 
0 -0,0386 -0,5791 No -0,0248 -0,1174 No 
 
0,0007 0,0693 No -0,0024 -0,2433 No 
1 0,0010 0,0729 No -0,0238 -0,5562 No 
 
-0,0010 -0,0966 No -0,0066 -0,6590 No 
2 -0,0094 -0,5878 No -0,0332 -0,6559 No 
 
-0,0042 -0,4157 No -0,0245 -2,4335 Yes 
3 -0,0226 -0,6832 No -0,0558 -0,5331 No 
 
-0,0179 -1,7745 No -0,0122 -1,2131 No 
4 -0,0147 -0,3538 No -0,0705 -0,5371 No 
 
0,0123 1,2204 No -0,0036 -0,3620 No 
5 0,0037 0,2188 No -0,0668 -1,2445 No 
 
0,0086 0,8511 No -0,0029 -0,2911 No 
6 0,0103 0,2796 No -0,0565 -0,4851 No 
 
0,0007 0,0709 No -0,0045 -0,4444 No 
7 0,0130 0,7603 No -0,0435 -0,8010 No 
 
-0,0015 -0,1532 No -0,0047 -0,4678 No 
8 -0,0136 -1,2032 No -0,0571 -1,5942 No 
 
-0,0002 -0,0234 No -0,0046 -0,4585 No 
9 0,0030 0,2735 No -0,0541 -1,5699 No 
 
0,0001 0,0093 No 0,0081 0,8035 No 
10 -0,0137 -0,6792 No -0,0678 -1,0645 No 
 
0,0127 1,2620 No 0,0081 0,8035 No 
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Table 7 
 
Norway   Poland 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 0,0149 1,3993 No 0,0149 1,3993 No 
 
0,0004 0,0524 No 0,0004 0,0214 No 
-9 0,0043 0,4001 No 0,0192 1,7994 No 
 
0,0003 0,0217 No 0,0007 0,0216 No 
-8 0,0138 1,2938 No 0,0329 3,0932 Yes 
 
0,0064 0,2701 No 0,0071 0,1228 No 
-7 -0,0272 -2,5566 Yes 0,0057 0,5366 No 
 
0,0240 0,3328 No 0,0310 0,1760 No 
-6 0,0236 2,2159 Yes 0,0293 2,7525 Yes 
 
-0,0118 -0,5752 No 0,0192 0,3813 No 
-5 -0,0059 -0,5570 No 0,0234 2,1955 Yes 
 
-0,0122 -0,6247 No 0,0070 0,1470 No 
-4 0,0195 1,8297 No 0,0428 4,0253 Yes 
 
0,0201 0,7578 No 0,0272 0,4172 No 
-3 0,0127 1,1922 No 0,0555 5,2174 Yes 
 
0,0002 0,0244 No 0,0274 1,2677 No 
-2 0,0423 3,9780 Yes 0,0979 9,1955 Yes 
 
-0,0148 -1,2438 No 0,0126 0,4341 No 
-1 0,0037 0,3434 No 0,1015 9,5389 Yes 
 
0,0055 0,3154 No 0,0181 0,4247 No 
0 0,0239 2,2418 Yes 0,1254 11,7808 Yes 
 
0,0206 0,6971 No 0,0387 0,5351 No 
1 0,0024 0,2249 No 0,1278 12,0057 Yes 
 
-0,0061 -0,5217 No 0,0326 1,1429 No 
2 0,0113 1,0607 No 0,1391 13,0663 Yes 
 
0,0126 0,7813 No 0,0452 1,1459 No 
3 -0,0029 -0,2728 No 0,1362 12,7935 Yes 
 
-0,0043 -0,3415 No 0,0409 1,3114 No 
4 -0,0078 -0,7300 No 0,1284 12,0634 Yes 
 
-0,0018 -0,1315 No 0,0390 1,1426 No 
5 -0,0034 -0,3227 No 0,1250 11,7408 Yes 
 
0,0089 0,4541 No 0,0480 0,9936 No 
6 0,0052 0,4841 No 0,1301 12,2249 Yes 
 
-0,0022 -0,3448 No 0,0458 2,9487 Yes 
7 0,0090 0,8452 No 0,1391 13,0701 Yes 
 
-0,0075 -0,5196 No 0,0383 1,0850 No 
8 -0,0143 -1,3458 No 0,1248 11,7243 Yes 
 
-0,0004 -0,0170 No 0,0379 0,6910 No 
9 0,0070 0,6530 No 0,1318 12,3773 Yes 
 
-0,0074 -0,5412 No 0,0305 0,9101 No 
10 -0,0063 -0,5920 No 0,1255 11,7853 Yes 
 
-0,0078 -0,7582 No 0,0227 0,8985 No 
 
   
                                                   
                                                      8 
 
Table 8 
 
Portugal   Sweden 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant   AAR t-statARR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 0,0053 0,2721 No 0,0053 0,1924 No 
 
-0,0065 -1,4252 No -0,0065 -0,7126 No 
-9 0,0038 0,1032 No 0,0090 0,1743 No 
 
0,0013 0,4084 No -0,0052 -0,8534 No 
-8 -0,0003 -0,0380 No 0,0088 0,8861 No 
 
-0,0145 -1,6535 No -0,0197 -1,1255 No 
-7 -0,0292 -1,4511 No -0,0205 -0,7182 No 
 
0,0047 0,5258 No -0,0150 -0,8293 No 
-6 -0,0108 -0,7025 No -0,0312 -1,4411 No 
 
0,0261 7,9763 Yes 0,0112 1,7045 No 
-5 0,0391 2,4155 Yes 0,0078 0,3430 No 
 
-0,0019 -0,2759 No 0,0093 0,6938 No 
-4 0,0380 1,6882 No 0,0458 1,4406 No 
 
0,0265 2,5744 Yes 0,0358 1,7403 No 
-3 -0,0040 -0,9619 No 0,0418 7,1288 Yes 
 
0,0002 0,0154 No 0,0359 1,7367 No 
-2 -0,0132 -1,2603 No 0,0286 1,9355 No 
 
0,0034 0,2408 No 0,0393 1,4047 No 
-1 0,0034 0,9107 No 0,0321 6,0247 Yes 
 
-0,0020 -0,4158 No 0,0373 3,8879 Yes 
0 0,0157 0,4175 No 0,0478 0,8961 No 
 
0,0102 4,4812 Yes 0,0475 10,4563 Yes 
1 0,0082 0,2694 No 0,0560 1,3049 No 
 
0,0058 1,4999 No 0,0533 6,8850 Yes 
2 0,0038 0,9821 No 0,0597 11,0168 Yes 
 
0,0170 6,1887 Yes 0,0703 12,7948 Yes 
3 -0,0188 -1,0930 No 0,0410 1,6871 No 
 
0,0074 1,3490 No 0,0777 7,0865 Yes 
4 -0,0155 -1,3062 No 0,0254 1,5102 No 
 
-0,0019 -0,6292 No 0,0758 12,4224 Yes 
5 -0,0042 -0,2615 No 0,0212 0,9380 No 
 
-0,0099 -1,3746 No 0,0658 4,5524 Yes 
6 -0,0167 -1,3314 No 0,0045 0,2534 No 
 
0,0102 9,0831 Yes 0,0761 33,7626 Yes 
7 -0,0186 -2,2936 Yes -0,0141 -1,2288 No 
 
0,0008 0,2487 No 0,0768 12,1556 Yes 
8 -0,0041 -4,4704 Yes -0,0182 -13,9518 Yes 
 
-0,0052 -0,8200 No 0,0717 5,6742 Yes 
9 -0,0215 -1,2770 No -0,0397 -1,6688 No 
 
0,0014 0,3734 No 0,0731 9,4713 Yes 
10 0,0034 0,8031 No -0,0363 -6,0515 Yes 
 
0,0001 0,0148 No 0,0732 4,7961 Yes 
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Table 9 
 
UK 
 
AAR t-statAAR Significant CAAR t-statCAAR Significant 
-10 0,0060 0,5969 No 0,0060 0,2985 No 
-9 0,0008 0,1087 No 0,0069 0,4426 No 
-8 -0,0122 -2,0777 Yes -0,0054 -0,4564 No 
-7 -0,0020 -0,3269 No -0,0074 -0,5981 No 
-6 0,0026 0,3966 No -0,0047 -0,3554 No 
-5 0,0098 0,5890 No 0,0051 0,1525 No 
-4 0,0032 1,4046 No 0,0083 1,8116 No 
-3 0,0021 0,3200 No 0,0104 0,7984 No 
-2 0,0043 1,1436 No 0,0147 1,9590 No 
-1 -0,0044 -0,6830 No 0,0103 0,7897 No 
0 -0,0047 -1,6561 No 0,0056 0,9857 No 
1 -0,0108 -0,7184 No -0,0052 -0,1730 No 
2 0,0170 1,8153 No 0,0118 0,6306 No 
3 0,0108 1,8569 No 0,0226 1,9451 No 
4 0,0340 1,2292 No 0,0566 1,0222 No 
5 -0,0095 -1,2918 No 0,0471 3,2094 Yes 
6 0,0077 1,3834 No 0,0548 4,9112 Yes 
7 0,0021 0,3391 No 0,0570 4,5449 Yes 
8 0,0010 0,2161 No 0,0580 6,1436 Yes 
9 0,0005 0,1081 No 0,0585 6,0096 Yes 
10 0,0054 1,6401 No 0,0639 9,6519 Yes 
 
